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To discuss the global efforts needed to detect
and control emerging infections, I will begin with
a personal experience. In 1987, a large epidemic
of meningococcal meningitis occurred during the
haj, the annual pilgrimage of Moslems to Mecca.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) sent a team of epidemiologists and
laboratorians to Kennedy Airport to meet the
thousands of pilgrims returning to the United
States. Returning pilgrims were given chemopro-
phylaxis; nasopharyngeal cultures showed that
11% of the pilgrims carried the epidemic strain of
group A Neisseria meningitidis, the causative
agent. Only 25% of the returning pilgrims were
intercepted and treated; thousands of others
dispersed throughout the country (presumably
with the same 11% carriage rate of this highly
virulent strain). Were U.S. surveillance systems
adequate to rapidly detect any subsequent
outbreaks? We were completely dependent on
local physicians to diagnose cases, on laboratories
to isolate and serotype the organism, on the
notification systems to inform the state and
federal agencies. In this instance, the United
States was fortunate and did not see any
secondary outbreaks. Other countries were not so
fortunate; large epidemics occurred in Chad,
Kenya, and Tanzania as a result of the same
virulent clone of N. meningitidis. The importa-
tion of this epidemic clone illustrates the central
importance of local capacity to diagnose, report,
and control emerging infectious diseases.
A more recent example is the 1997 influenza
H5N1 outbreak in Hong Kong: the outbreak
illustrates what systems are needed to detect a
new organism and to respond appropriately.
First, the Hong Kong public health system had to
have the capacity to isolate the organism and to
recognize that it was not an ordinary influenza
strain. Because infections emerge at the local
level, the capacity to detect new threats when
they arise should be available throughout the
world. Secondly, the specialized diagnostic
reagents had to be available and the reference
laboratories had to be able to make a definitive
identification, not just of that initial strain, but of
the hundreds of other strains evaluated. In this
case, H5 reagents (the result of National
Institutes of Health [NIH] research) had been
distributed (by CDC) to reference laboratories
internationally. The capacity to respond to
potential outbreaks with expert epidemiologic
investigation also had to be in place. The team
that went to Hong Kong consisted of epidemiolo-
gists, laboratorians, a public affairs specialist,
and an expert in animal influenza. The team
worked closely with Hong Kong colleagues to
detect new cases by implementing an enhanced
surveillance system. They targeted not only
hospitals but also outpatient settings. Most
importantly, they designed studies to rapidly
determine whether the strain could be transmit-
ted from human to human. Would the H5N1
isolates share the pathogenic potential of human
influenza, which is so readily transmissible from
human to human, or was this strain relatively
limited in its ability to spread? The kind of rapid
but rigorous epidemiologic studies undertaken by
the outbreak response team were invaluable in
answering this question; fortunately, the strain
had limited potential for human-to-human
transmission. Still, we cannot become compla-
cent; given the genetic recombination potential of
influenza viruses, we need to maintain and
enhance our surveillance systems worldwide.
Through the U.S. emerging infections
initiative, the number of laboratory surveillance
sites supported to look for new influenza strains
has been increased. In China, sites had been
expanded from 6 to 12, which improved the
ability of the World Health Organization (WHO)
system to monitor evidence of dissemination of
this strain on the Chinese mainland. Through
the CDC WHO Collaborating Center on
Influenza, we made diagnostic kits based on the
NIH H5 reagents available to reference
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laboratories around the world so that many
different areas can detect H5N1 should it emerge.
At the same time, the WHO Collaborating Center
was actively engaged in training activities.
The H5N1 example shows that we are
somewhat better able to deal with emerging
infections in 1997 and 1998 than we were in 1987.
The example also underscores what is needed:
dramatically strengthened local surveillance,
including both laboratory and epidemiologic
capacity; commitment on the part of local
governments; and a strong collaborative interna-
tional research and response system.
Two other areas of international capacity
development contribute to effective response to
emerging infections. The first is Field Epidemiol-
ogy Training Programs. These programs operate
on the assumption that the best way to develop
epidemiologic capacity in a country is to train
local professionals who are committed to
continuing to work with the government in
surveillance, outbreak response, epidemiology,
and other aspects of public health management.
Field Epidemiology Training Programs have
been developed in 17 countries. These programs
are now planning to create an executive
secretariat to facilitate collaboration and provide
regional expertise. WHO and CDC are working
with these countries to ensure necessary support
and coordination with international surveillance.
The second area is communication systems. The
Internet globally facilitates our ability to share
technical and surveillance information.
We are better able in 1998 to address the
threats of emerging infections, but we are by no
means fully prepared. We must have the capacity
to identify new or reemerging threats and to
respond successfully. We need to be creative and
efficient in identifying necessary resources; for
example, the polio eradication program has
developed a global network of laboratories and is
strengthening the surveillance systems needed
to identify poliomyelitis cases. Eradication
activities also contribute to health capacity
development, and the laboratory and surveil-
lance capacities created for polio eradication
should also be useful in detection of and response
to emerging infectious diseases. Many other
creative approaches and collaborations are
needed for an effective global response to
whatever our microbial adversaries may produce.
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